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BOOK REVIEWS 
Best-Kept Secret: 
Canadian Secret Intelligence 
in the 
Second World War 
John Bryden. Best-Kept Secret: 
Canadian Secret Intelligence in 
the Second World War (Toronto: 
Lester Publishing, 1993). 390 
pages, $28.95. 
I n the previous issue I discussed a recent book on transatlantic 
intelligence sharing during the 
Second World War - Bradley F. 
Smith's examination of British-
American dealings over the 
sharing of cryptanalytic secrets. 
(Canadian Military History, Vol.3, 
No.1. (Spring 1994)pp.135-139.) 
Out of their complex and often 
difficult negotiations there evolved 
a relationship not only important 
in the war against Germany and 
Japan, but for peacetime too; the 
Ultra/Magic pacts built the 
foundation of a transatlantic 
intelligence charter that helped 
shape the world for the Cold War 
as well. Smith concentrates 
almost exclusively on the British 
and Americans, digging with 
remarkable success into the 
archives in London and especially 
Washington. But he never made 
it to Ottawa, and invariably omits 
the Canadian dimension to this 
triangular transatlantic story. 
John Bryden's book, Best-Kept 
Secret: Canadian Secret Intelli-
gence in the Second World War, 
helps fill in that crucial gap. 
Let me first get rid of several 
irritations with the book that will 
undoubtably conspire to interfere 
with a fair response by other 
historians, too. Bryden, who since 
the lastfederal election is an M.P., 
describes himself as "an investi-
gative historian, combining the 
sleuthing qualities of the journal-
ist with the scholarly discipline 
of the academic." If only it were 
true. At heart Bryden is the 
journalist seeking the exclusive 
scoop and placing himself at the 
centre of his story. The first word 
in his book is the personal 
pronoun, and the first sentence of 
the Introduction portentously claims 
that, 'This is a book of many secrets, 
disclosed here for the first time." 
Reach for the salt cellar, folks, 
because here we're in the land of 
media hype. It's difficult to get 
through the Introduction, indeed, 
without marvelling, or gagging, at 
the sheer chutzpah of an author 
who can write in all seriousness 
that "My research disclosed that 
Canada had been an intimate 
partner of Britain and the United 
States in almost all areas of secret 
intelligence during the Second 
World War." His research has 
revealed that? Where are all those 
historians who've written about 
Canada and the Second World 
War during the last fifty years? Or 
those in particular who've been 
digging in this patch for at least a 
decade? One braces oneselffor the 
revelation that Mackenzie King was 
an eccentric, dog-loving bachelor 
who spoke to his dead mother 
during these critical years. 
It's not just that Bryden pre-
tends he's the only one to have 
ploughed the furrow, it's his lack 
of generosity in crediting others 
that sticks in the throat. In fact, 
for someone who claims to be 
an historian, he possesses a 
curiously cavalier attitude towards 
his fellows and a breathtaking 
methodology that would earn him 
a failing grade in graduate school. 
He tells us that early on he 
decided to reject all secondary 
sources which were not either 
autobiographical or backed up by 
archival records. Other than those 
dealing with wartime operational 
intelligence, he confesses, "that 
eliminated most British books on 
the subject." Christopher 
Andrew's book, Secret Service, he 
dismisses as "poorly documented" 
(at least it has a bibliography, 
unlike his own). and as for 
Hinsley's multi-volume official 
history of British wartime intelli-
gence, Bryden considers it highly 
suspect, based as it is on sources 
the public cannot check. It's one 
thing to be sceptical, another to 
be totally cynical. In any case, 
Bryden prefers, wait for it, Peter 
Wright's Spycatcher( 1987) as "the 
best book on the British secret 
services." What is scepticism 
worth here? As for Canadian 
books, he mentions only two as 
worthy of serious consideration: 
John Sawatsky's Gouzenko: The 
Untold Story ( 1984 ), and - should 
I be grateful? - my own Camp X 
(1986). Only one Canadian arti-
cle meets his approval: Bill 
Robinson's "Fall and Rise of 
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Cryptanalysis in Canada" in the 
January 1992 issue of Cryptologia 
(an excellent article, incidentally). 
'There was not much else of value to 
choose from," sighs our author. No 
wonder he omits a bibliography. 
Fortunately, the book fails to 
live down to its promise. In the 
end Bryden salvages something 
from the damage and produces a 
book that, read with care, tells a 
useful story about Canada's role in 
the wartime intelligence alliance. And 
as a journalist, he knows how to 
write something without triggering 
immediate narcolepsy. 
He's certainly a good investi-
gative digger in the archives, and 
he's used the Access to Informa-
tion Act, and its U.S. equivalent, 
imaginatively and to good effect to 
provide us with much basic data 
about the origins, evolution and 
eventual demise of Canada's 
cryptanalytic agency, the 
Examination Unit. Cross-checking 
documents released in Ottawa and 
Washington, he has filled in many 
of the gaps deliberately blanked 
out by the screeners. So we leam 
of names and countries that our 
guardians would still prefer us 
not to know about. Of particular 
interest is the confirmation of how 
extensively Canada and its allies 
were eavesdropping on neutral 
and even Allied diplomatic traffic. 
Bryden does us a favour in 
reminding us how important these 
intercepts were. In the obsessive 
(and understandable) focus by 
scholars on military intercepts, 
non-military intercepts (not just 
diplomatic, but commercial too) 
have been neglected. They touch 
on some still sensitive issues such 
as spying on neutrals, and worse, 
on Allies. But here again Bryden 
goes overboard. This is not so 
new to specialists, and it's reveal-
ing that. ploughing through the 
footnotes, I found not a single 
reference to any article from 
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Intelligence and National Security or 
the International Journal Q[ Intelli-
gence and Counter-Intelligence, the 
two leading journals in the field. 
The basic story he reveals is 
how the Examination Unit, once 
established, tried to find a useful 
role to play in inter-allied intelli-
gence without getting swallowed 
up by the British or Americans 
and how, at the end of the war, 
Canadian decided to continue 
their efforts in order to assume 
some independent intelligence 
capacity rather than rely on the 
assessmentsofotherpowers. But 
for all his valiant efforts to praise 
Canada's achievements, it's 
difficult not to come away with the 
impression that we were indeed 
minor players in this field, 
outgunned, outmanoeuvred, and 
bypassed by our larger and more 
experienced partners. As an at-
tempt at national boosterism it 
seems to me that this book fails. 
It works far better if read along 
with the work of others in this 
field, and indeed Byron and Smith 
usefully complement each other. 
Both examine allied conferences 
on intelligence sharing, mostly 
held in or around Washington 
D.C., and by comparing their 
accounts one can get a far more 
rounded picture of what actually 
happened than each, individually, 
produces. To give but one exam-
ple: Bradley Smith's account of 
the crucial and historic BRUSA 
agreement on the sharing of 
finished intelligence, formalised 
in Washington in June 1943, 
makes the point that it explicitly 
excluded diplomatic traffic, but 
that in practice British-American 
exchanges in this sphere were 
alreadytakingplace. Brydenhelps 
complete the picture with an 
account of an earlier meeting at 
Arlington Hall, Virginia, in January 
1943 to discuss the monitoring of 
diplomatic traffic - a meeting not 
mentioned by Smith at all. This is 
helpful, and with Smith's broader 
and more coherent conceptual 
framework historians interested 
in this field can gain a great deal 
from the two books together. 
There's a real irony here. 
Scholars are still replicating 
the selfsame national barriers 
they're so apt to expose and 
deplore when studying the 
behaviour of nation states during 
the Second World War. The story 
of inter-allied intelligence 
relations, indeed, allied relations 
of any kind, cannot be sensibly 
confined within the narrow 
blinkers most of us continue to 
wear. Inter-allied intelligence 
co-operation, so vital for the war 
effort, was only slowly achieved, 
and then not completely, as a 
result of hard work and grind in 
overcoming national jealousies, 
interests and insecurities. As 
historians, individually and as a 
profession, we still mostly work in 
some kind of nationalist paradigm 
that not only determines the 
questions we ask (not to mention 
the answers we give). but also 
isolates us from the work of 
scholars working on closely 
related subjects elsewhere, and 
makes genuine and fruitful 
co-operation difficult or impossible. 
In our perspectives and methods 
it seems that, living in our 
national boxes, we have learned 
little from the past. 
David Stafford 
University of Edinburgh 
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